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systems of government than their own. So
equipped, these citizen-athletes are less prepared
to accept unconditionally a regime lacking in
human rights as a way of life. Thus, the ground
work is arguably laid for the concept of greater human rights.
Sports have traditionally played a large role in
the expansion of rights. A terrific example is the
requirement that U.S. universities provide an equal
playing field in terms of number of sporting opportunities for both male and female varsity athletes.
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, Amy
Cohen et al v. Brown University, No. 95-2205).
Female athletes, exposed on campus to a larger
number of varsity teams available to male athletes
than to themselves, came to view this discrepancy
as wrong and rightfully protested the incongruity.
Eventually, equality (at least in terms of absolute
number of teams for men and women) was mandated by the courts. Similarly, athletes at international events are exposed to human rights discrepancies between their own country and the countries of their competitors. The importance of sporting events in highlighting human rights should
not be underestimated.

Study Abroad
Study abroad programs have become more and
more popular among university students searching to broaden both their academic education and
their exposure to different cultures. (See Bill
Nolting and Clay Hubbs, Education Abroad Bibliography, 1997). Similar to the role of international
sporting events, programs for students to pursue
studies outside of their own country is another undervalued method for the spread of basic human
rights. The value of such programs is particularly
highlighted in graduate studies, where students
have already achieved some degree of educational
sophistication, allowing them to be more open to
intellectual discussion than their more junior
undergraduate colleagues. Graduate students
typically are involved in a greater degree of independent research, which encourages them to
seek out dialogue beyond the printed syllabus of
an undergraduate course. As a result, their exposure to the culture they are living in and studying
in is increased greatly, affording them more
opportunity to interact with the citizens of their
host country.
Students are able, in effect, to compare the
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degree of human rights between different countries. Those students blessed with living in a more
tolerant state serve as unofficial diplomats of
democracy, while those students living in less
fortunate circumstances are exposed to the principles of human rights. While students may not be
able to force restrictive governments to become
more tolerant of human rights, as evidenced by
events in China, once introduced, the concept of
human rights cannot be "de-introduced." Instead, it
now becomes possible for persons to covet those
human rights they have begun to realize they donot possess.

Non-Traditional Diplomats
Professor Tes6n's call for the global promotion
of universal respect for human rights is extremely
important. While the traditional modes of diplomacy can play a large role in this effort, the nontraditional diplomats, such as the Roman Catholic
Church, international athletes and students studying abroad, also have a contribution to make in
this regard. While their roles as diplomats may be
more evolutionary than revolutionary, their contributions are surely not.
Lynne M. Jurgielewicz
Tilden Township, PA

The Right To Republican
Government Under
International Law
The fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of
East and Central Europe have emboldened international lawyers to reassert the principles of
human rights and democracy that intermittently
inspired their predecessors over the last four centuries. Some such arguments rely on state practice. Thomas Franck and others have demonstrated
that many governments now formally recognize
some sort of individual or collective right to selfgovernment. This is the "positivist" argument for
liberal democracy.
Other scholars, such as Fernando Tes6n, make
the same argument from a "naturalist" or "deontological" perspective (to use Tes6n's vocabulary),
identifying human rights that exist whether or not
states recognize them as binding in practice. This

2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW ° WASHINGTON, DC 20008

° 1998

°

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 0 45

more direct approach better reflects the moral truth
that obligates states to obey international law,
but understates the value of their agreement or
deliberation about the content of legal standards,
and how to enforce them. This paper will advocate an intermediate position in insisting that all
people have the right to republican government,
which is to say to government for their own individual and collective good or well-being, but also
that people speak best through the organized
structure of republican institutions. Bald assertions by scholars of detailed lists of individual
rights are only slightly more likely to be correct
than bald assertions made by the governments or
foreign ministries of existing non-republican states.
The Positivist Mistake
Self-styled "positivists" in international law
mistakenly derive international obligation from
state consent, or recognition. This confuses power
with authority, by attributing binding force to the
views of various despots or tyrants, whose actual
influence depends more often than not on terror,
force or usurpation. Such sovereigns' "consent"
obligates no one, nor do any existing human rights
become more (or less) binding on states because
governments have agreed (or not) that such rights
apply to them. In practice, states will be more
likely to implement rights that they publicly agree
to exist, but even that is open to question. The
existence of rights influences state behavior with
or without agreement, and governments frequently
violate rights that they have formally endorsed as
binding.
States do, however, often also maintain internal
legal systems that operate to some extent independently of the immediate desires of the leaders that
they serve. To the extent that states have "law",
they recognize legal principles of general application, which they claim to be morally justified. States
that recognize preexisting human rights thereby
make it more likely that their own legal system will
recognize and apply these rights in practice. To
this extent it makes a difference that states recognize
human rights, and states should be encouraged to
do so.
In fact, as Fernando Tes6n has observed, democracies are more likely to recognize human rights
than other states have been, and having recognized human rights, democracies are more likely
to implement and protect them. This stands as a
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powerful argument in favor of democracy. Positive law in municipal legal systems can strengthen
the application of justice to particular peoples inparticular cases. States earn their legitimacy by
serving the individual and collective good of their
subjects. Since democracies serve fundamental human rights better than other types of government,
they are more legitimate than other types of governments, and their directives more binding.

The Rousseaunian Mistake
The value of democracy in protecting fundamental human rights has misled some of its
advocates to endorse democratic institutions as the
sole or final arbiter of international legitimacy. Just
as positivists view the consent of existing governments as decisive in measuring the validity of international norms or standards, so some democrats treat majority votes as the sole conclusive
measure of obligation under international law.
This loses sight of the purposes that justify democratic voting in the first place. Universal participation in voting prevents self-interested elites from
running the state in their own interests. It does not
license the majority to usurp state power in pursuit
its own self-interested private agenda.
Some types of coordination problems may best
be solved by the essentially random (or even somewhat self-interested) procedure of majority
voting. The maximum width of the continental
shelf may be settled, perhaps, by the vote of all
states. The direction of traffic may be settled by
plebiscite, or the distribution of executive authority.
These sorts of questions do not necessarily admit of
"right" or "just' answers. They do need some answer, so that society may move forward. On other
questions, such as human rights, or the
definition of crimes, getting the right answer determines the legitimacy of the government concerned. Democracy is required under international
law and justice, because non-democratic states usually get such questions wrong, due to the self-interest of their rulers.
This does not mean that democracies always get
such questions right. Democracies do not constitute republics unless they serve the individual
and common good of the people, in preference to
that of a majority, or elected elites. All republics are
democracies, but not all democracies are republics.
The rule of law, an independent judiciary,
respect for fundamental human rights, the separa-
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tion of powers, bicameral checks and balances,
representative government and other republican
safeguards must be in place, before democracies
will serve the republican purposes that alone
confer legitimacy on the coercive power of the state.

The Liberal Mistake
The excesses of certain democratic regimes have
caused some liberals to denigrate democracy itself,
or to minimize its importance under international
law. Liberals rightly view universal human rights
as fundamental to human well-being, and condition all governments' legitimacy on their respect
for human rights. But liberal scholars and lawyers
often do not understand democracy's centrality in
achieving this goal. Fernando Tes6n, for example,
values democracy for the equal concern and respect
that it shows citizens, for its generally peaceful
attitude to foreigners, and for its usual respect for
human rights, but questions its role in the "deliberative process" of discovering human rights
and protecting them. Liberalism emerged as a
distinct philosophy by setting aside democracy
and political science in the wake of Robespierre's
terror, when many blamed unfettered democracy
for the destruction of France. Fear of democracy has
weakened liberalism ever since.
The problem with liberalism's agnosticism
about political procedures lies in the danger rights
face without general agreement to recognize and
enforce them. Non-republican governments will
not readily recognize rights nor protect them. While
individual scholars may assert the existence of certain rights, such rights will not enjoy widespread
recognition or legitimacy until they are tested by
public deliberation. Non-democratic governments
simply will not respect or even accurately identify
what fundamental human rights entail. States
without independent judges, the rule of law, the
separation of powers, a mixed and balanced bicameral legislature and an elected representative
assembly will not defend human rights, or treat all
citizens with equal concern and respect, or show
restraint in their international affairs, because they
lack the republican defenses that would help them
to do so.
Liberalism requires republican institutions, including democracy, to realize its goals. Liberals
who assert the primacy of certain rights, without
subjecting them to the test of public reason in a republican deliberative procedure, will often make
mistakes, pursuing unwarranted interventions in
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the frenzy of their own self-righteous self-importance. Decent humility demands that would-be
arbiters of international obligation test their convictions against the best available procedures for
taking everyone's insights into account, treating
every person and people's well-being with equal
concern and respect. Such republican procedures
go beyond democracy, in their search for universal human rights, but also respect the separate
needs of different nations and cultures, which
liberal universalism may sometimes violate or
overlook.

Conclusion
International law derives whatever binding
force it has from its ability correctly to determine the international rights and obligations of
states and individuals. Positivists overvalue the
importance of existing state governments in making these determinations. Democrats overvalue
the importance of simple majority decisions. Liberals overvalue their own standing to dictate rights
to the world. Republican government satisfies the
needs of all three viewpoints, by showing how
states may earn the legitimacy democratically to
determine the human rights due to all their citizens.
Without the support of republican institutions and
principles, international law would become the
nebulous assertion of rival moralities, without authority to control state behavior or selfinterest, in any specific situation.
Only republican structures of government can
legitimately determine the content of international
law sufficiently to deserve deference from actors
in the international arena. Republican deliberation confirms the nature of existing international
norms. Neither treaties, nor practice, nor democratic majorities, nor academic declarations of
rights can stand as proxies for real moral discourse
in settling the content of the law. The right to republican government under international law is
the ultimate source of all international obligation,
just as the right to republican government is the
only real source of obligation in domestic systems of
law. Governments exist for the collective and
individual well-being of those subject to their
control. When they violate human well-being,
states forfeit their authority to rule.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
School of Law
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